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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 19/05/2006 Accident number: 306 
Accident time: 07:05 Accident Date: 26/06/2001 
Where it occurred: MF MAG/E/0099 Country: Iraq 
Primary cause: Inadequate equipment 
(?) 
Secondary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: 28/06/2001 
ID original source: JJ Name of source: UN/JJ/AVS 2001:KI03 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: VS50 AP blast Ground condition: grass/grazing area 
soft 
Date record created: 19/02/2004 Date  last modified: 19/02/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: MF MAG/E/0099 Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
pressure to work quickly (?) 
inadequate equipment (?) 
visor not worn or worn raised (?) 
handtool may have increased injury (?) 
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?) 
inadequate investigation (?) 
 
Accident report 
A UNOPS MAP Board of Inquiry was instigated and the following BOI report provided. 
Apparently for “political” reasons, the original report was not provided. What was provided did 
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not include details of the demining group’s name. The following has been edited to allow it to 
be read smoothly. 
The victim had been employed for three months prior to the accident, beginning work in the 
minefield on 1st April 2001.    
On the day of the accident the weather was fine and hot, the ground was soft and flat, the 
vegetation was sparse grass to a height of 10cm. The method of clearance being used was a 
“full excavation”. 
On the day of the accident the team had started work at 06:20hrs and had conducted a 
change over drill at 06:50hrs.  The victim had been working in his lane for the first time that 
day for only 15 minutes when the accident happened.  His section leader had conducted a 
routine check of the victim’s clearance lane only two minutes before the accident.  
The victim was squatting while carrying out a “full excavation clearance” drill in the lane. He 
was using an unauthorised digging tool when he detonated a VS50 anti-personnel mine. The 
excavation tool is use was a Garden Trowel. The excavation tool was being used in a pushing 
motion rather than a scraping motion. 
The victim sustained “injuries” to both eyes, a “big wound in the neck caused by a big shell, 
(Lt. Hand) two fingers amputated and open fracture in wrist join; Small wound in the face and 
below knees”. 
The injured deminer was treated immediately (07:15) and under constant medical attention for 
the duration of his journey to the main hospital.  He was stabilized and evacuated from site 
within 13 minutes of the accident and in the Sub-District hospital by 08:00. From here he was 
taken to the District Hospital arriving at 08:45 and held there for observation and redressing of 
his wounds until 09:05 before being referred to Main Emergency Hospital arriving at 11:45. 
The victim was wearing a Full-face Visor (30cm and Strap) and a “Vest procured from The 
Trading Force”. The investigators reported that there was a gap between the bottom of the 
visor and the top of the collar of the protective vest.  
 
Conclusion 
The BOI concluded that the blast marks on the front of the visor showed that it “had been 
worn correctly”. 
The victim’s visor was “scratched and sustained blast” and his protective vest showed “cuts 
and impact of rocks and dirt sustained blast”. They found “a bent and partly broken 
excavation tool and severe tearing of the left-hand glove”. 
“The investigation team believe that a combination of the potential force of the modified 
digging tool, the manner in which it was being used and his squatting position caused the 
casualty to detonate the mine with the back of his hand. The accident was human error.” 
 
Recommendations 
The investigators made the following recommendations: 
“Any disciplinary action against the deminer is at the discretion of the PC and Manual 
Clearance Contractor’s PM. 
1. Manual Clearance Contractor’s SOP No. 1.3.8 and 7.3.5 should be reviewed immediately 
to possibly allow SL/DTL/TL [abbreviation for field supervisors] to approach and observe 
working deminers without the secession of work. 
2. Review the excavation drill to determine if it is the best method available. 
3. Review the kneeling position with a view to reducing fatigue levels and possible 
introduction of alternative working positions. 
4. The removal of unauthorized excavation tools needs to take place immediately. 
5. There needs to be a review and inspection process within the program to assess the 
suitability of the varying types of current digging tools. 
6. The feasibility of future digging tools being manufactured from hardened steel with hand 
guards to prevent the loss of fingers. 
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7. Immediate retraining in the use of the new excavation tool to reinforce its suitability and 
dispel the current rumours about the tool. 
8. The withdrawal of all dark blue vests as they do not offer rigid neck protection, and, when 
used with the visor increase the chance of eye damage. Alternatively address the armour 
slippage problem, modify the neck flap if it is viable in country. Should this not be able to 
be achieved then withdraw the vest from the program. 
9. All visors shall be inspected to remove and replace faulty wingnuts. The program should 
assess the viability of using face goggles either singularly or in combination with visors to 
add an extra level of protection and reduce soft tissue eye damage in the event of mine 
explosions. 
10. Manual Clearance Contractor to immediately investigate the deminers allegations of 
coercion regarding metres cleared per day, and further to that re-educate all program 
deminers on their responsibilities and dispel any misconceptions that may be in the teams 
at the moment.” 
Appendices referenced in the report were not made available. 
Summarised Statements from the Team Leader, Site Commander, Witnesses and the victim 
were not made available.  
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 386 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: 3 hours 40 minutes 
Protection issued: Frontal apron 
Long visor 
Protection used: Frontal apron; Long 
visor 
 
Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES 
minor Face 
minor Legs 
severe Eyes 
severe Hand 
severe Neck 
AMPUTATION/LOSS 
Fingers  
COMMENT 
See medical report. 
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Medical report 
No formal medical report was made available. The BOI stated that: 
The victim sustained “injuries” to both eyes, a “big wound in the neck caused by a big shell, 
(Lt. Hand) two fingers amputated and open fracture in wrist join; Small wound in the face and 
below knees”. 
The victim was treated immediately (07:15) and under constant medical attention for the 
duration of his journey to the main hospital.  He was stabilized and evacuated from site within 
13 minutes of the accident and in the Sub-District hospital by 08:00. From here he was taken 
to the District Hospital arriving at 08:45hrs and held there for observation and redressing of 
his wounds until 09:05hrs before being referred to Main Emergency Hospital arriving at 
11:45hrs. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as “Inadequate equipment”” because it seems that 
the victim was using an unauthorised tool in an unauthorised manner when the accident 
occurred. The provision of appropriate tools and training is a management responsibility. The 
supervision of the working method is a field control responsibility, so the secondary cause is 
listed as a “Field control inadequacy” because the victim was not corrected about wearing his 
visor raised or about using his tool correctly. That there was a pressure for the deminers to 
work quickly is implied by the Board of Inquiry's recommendation “10”, which would be a 
further management failing. 
The analysis of this accident is hampered by the fact that the full report of the Board of 
Inquiry, including statements of witnesses, was not made available. On the evidence available 
it seems that the BOI made significant errors (two examples follow). 
1) The investigators were wrong to conclude that the victim’s visor was being worn correctly 
simply because there were marks on the outside of it. Recommendation “9” concerns the 
replacement of “faulty” visor “wing-nuts” – implying that some of those present complained of 
faults. The victim may have been obliged to wear the visor raised because of “faulty” 
fastenings. For whatever reason, a 30cm long full-face visor must have been at least partly 
raised for the wearer to sustain injury to both eyes.  
2) The investigators made the ill-informed recommendation “6” calling for a feasibility study on 
“digging tools being manufactured from hardened steel with hand guards to prevent the loss 
of fingers”. Hardened steel shatters in an explosion and so increase the risk of severe injury. 
Work on the right steels has been done. The same work showed that tool length is a more 
effective means of reducing blast damage than a hand guard on its own. 
The failure of the BOI to investigate the circumstances thoroughly is a serious “Management 
Control Inadequacy” meaning that an opportunity to correct dangerous practises was lost. 
  
 
4 
